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MICHING MALLECHO: THE TAX REFORMERS'
SNEAK ATTACK ON CONGLOMERATES
DANIEL CANDEE KNICKERBOCKER, JR.*
The furore over conglomerates, and the many-pronged attack now
being waged against them, have been characterized as the establishment's
response to such acts of lse-majest as Leasco's bid for the Chemical. Ac-
cording to this rationale, the forces of securities regulation, antitrust and
tax-to say nothing of the whole American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants- have been mobilized to make the world safe from Sol Stein-
berg and Charles Bluhdorn. A bas les parvenusl
The explanation derives from the conspiracy theory of history. As is
true of all others of like parentage, it can be tested only by reference to its
outward manifestations. And if we make this test in the tax field, we are
forced to conclude that either the establishment is pretty weak, or that its
sense of outrage with the conglomerateurs' is pretty mild. For here, at least,
the response is remarkably faint-hearted.
In its report accompanying the Tax Reform Bill of 1969, the Ways and
Means Committee never expressly condemned the merger movement as evil;
the implication was there, but not the flat statement. Noting that "in recent
years, there has been a significant increase in the number of corporate
mergers ... and also in the size of the corporations involved,"2 the report
observed that "[t]his trend . . . raises numerous significant questions, such
as its effect on the competitive climate . . . , including the growth oppor-
tunities available for new finns, the changes . . . in the degree of economic
concentration .... and the overall effect . . . on the .. . economy." 3 This,
said the Committee, impelled concern for those "features of the tax laws...
[believed to] provide a special and unwarranted inducement to mergers." 4
For such features, four remedies were deemed salutary:
First, disallowance of a part of the interest deductions otherwise
allowable to a corporation in any year in respect of the debt it has incurred
in making acquisitions;5
Second, denial of the use of the installment method for reporting gain
in transactions not requiring periodic payments, or in those in which the
purchaser's obligation takes the form of a marketable security;6
* Vice President and Counsel, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company. A.B.,
Syracuse University, 1940; LL.B., Cornell University, 1950.
1 1 am not sure that this is a legal or commercial word of art. I have seen it used
only in the society columns of a newspaper: "The Marquesa de Portago," the report read,
"was married here yesterday afternoon to Richard C. Pistell, the conglomerateur." N.Y.
Times, May 23, 1969, at 41, col. 1 (city ed.).
2 HR. RaP. 413, pt. 1, at 101.
314 .
41d.
5 House Version § 411, I.R.C. § 279 (new).
6 7d. § 412, I.R.C. § 453(b) (amend.).
1047
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Third, requiring the holders of corporate debt to accrue any original
issue discount thereon over the life of the obligation instead of accounting
for such discount upon sale or maturity;7 and
Fourth, limiting the deduction allowable to a corporation upon a
repurchase of its own convertible debt at a premium to an amount equal
to "a normal call premium on ...evidences of indebtedness which are
not convertible."8
To even the most casual observer, these remedial provisions do not
seem to remedy very much. The conglomerate ("conglamorate" according to
more than one unconscious wit) movement may, indeed, suffer far more as
a result of other provisions of the Tax Reform Act not specifically aimed
at it. Thus, new rules that will subject to tax stock dividends paid on pre-
ferred stock, or distributions or arrangements (including those involving
both convertible preferred and convertible debt) which have the effect of
shifting proportionate interests within the corporation, 9 could have the ef-
fect of curtailing use of the kinds of securities issued in conglomerate acquisi-
tions. Since one has the impression that many conglomerate mergers have
succeeded simply by reason of the imaginative paper used in them, such a
limitation might prove fatal to future transactions so based.
In its recent report on mergers, the staff of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) singled out, as one of the "institutional biases encouraging
mergers," the favorable tax treatment accorded ABC transactions in the
extractive industries. 10 Two acquisitions - those of Consolidation Coal by
Continental Oil in 1966, and of Peabody Coal by Kennecott Copper in
1968 - had certainly involved use of the device; a third, the acquisition
(also in 1968) of Island Creek Coal by Occidental Petroleum may have."
The new law treats all production payments, both carved-out and retained,
as loans by their holders to the owner of the mineral property.12 This par-
ticular aid to economic concentration has now passed on into history.
The Senate Version of the Tax Reform Bill struck at least one blow at
mergers that the House Version had missed. It appeared that a number of
corporations, primarily insurance companies, had accumulated sizable
blocks of their own shares in exchanges for appreciated securities. To the
sellers of the shares the tax result was the same as would have obtained in
cash transactions. For the corporations, however, there was an enormous
difference: the exchanges, according to Internal Revenue Service rulings,
resulted in no recognized gain, and
7 Id. § 413, I.R.C. §§ 1232(a), 1232(b)(2), 6049(c) (amend.).
8 Id. § 414, I.R.C. § 249 (new).
9 Id. § 421, I.R.C. § 305 (amend.).
10 BUREAU OF EcONOMIcs, FTC, ECONOMic REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS 158 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT], submitted by the FTC, without adoption, as "a
useful background for the development of public policy," to the Subcomm. on Antitrust
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
11 Id.
12 Tax Reform Act § 501, I.R.C. § 636 (new).
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the .. .companies can then retire the stock they have bought back,
thereby increasing pershare earnings. Or they can use it later to make
acquisitions- again on a tax-free basis. (Because of the convolutions
of the tax laws, the companies cannot use portfolio stock directly in an
acquisition without paying the usual capital gains tax.)ls
It is evidence of present Congressional sensitivity to tax abuse that the story
from which the above is quoted had not even reached the public before
the Senate Finance Committee announced action. "This sort of exchange in
the future," the press release said, "will give rise to taxable gain.' 14
In any event, section 905 of the Act amends Code section 311 to provide
in general that when (after November 30, 1969) a corporation distributes
property (other than its own evidences of indebtedness) in redemption of its
stock, and the property has a value in excess of the corporation's basis there-
for, then gain will be recognized just as if the corporation had then sold
the property so distributed. 15 The new rule will not apply to distributions
in complete or partial liquidation, or to those made in connection with re-
organizations or split-offs.16 It will also be inapplicable to:
(I) distributions completely terminating the interest of a 10 percent
(or more) shareholder;17
(2) distributions of the stock of 50 percent (or more)-owned sub-
sidiaries;' 8
(3) distributions in compliance with antitrust decrees; 19
distributions to effect section 303 redemptions; 20
(4) distributions to private foundations to reduce their "excess business
holdings";2 ' and
(5) distributions by regulated investment companies. 22
The exceptions serve only to make the jest more excruciating. One must
pity the poor tax planner. He no sooner gets a good thing going than some
nudnick stridently blows the gaff.
Typically, the coin used in an acquisition is stock of the acquiring com-
pany.28 For this reason, the market popularity of that stock is determinative
of the company's capacity for engaging in the operation. Anything that
lessens the public's appetite for the glamor issues is a deterrent. The dis-
allowance of some of the interest deductions of non-corporate taxpayers on
13 The Great Tax-Free Cash-In, FoREs, Nov. 1, 1969, at 52 (emphasis as in original).
Cf., Watts, Recognition of Gain or Loss to a Corporation on A Distribution of Property
in Exchange for its Own Stock, 22 TAx LAW. 161 (1968).
14 DAILY RFP. ExEc. G-7 (Oct. 31, 1969).
15 I.R.C. § 311(d)(1) (new).
16 Id. See also H.R. REP. 782, at 333.
171.R.C. § 311(d)(1)(A).
18 Id. § 311(d)(1)(B).
191d. § 311(d)(1)(D).
201d. 3l1(d)(l)(E).
211d. § 311(d)(1)(F).
221d. § 311(d)(l)(G).
23 The staff of the FTC estimates that 85 percent of "recent large mergers" were tax-
free stock-for-stock transactions. FTC REPoRT 25.
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account of debt incurred to make investments 24 might have such an effect:
the acceptance of an exceptionally low current yield, the identifying feature
of growth stocks, would necessarily extend this disallowance. Inhibitions on
the investments of private foundations and other exempt organizations25
might also weaken the market, as also might the repeal of the investment
credit 26 and restrictions on the use of accelerated depreciation methods. 27
Both of these last will probably prove of less significance today than they
would have before the AICPA and the SEC began to focus on some of the
more misleading accounting practices. 28 Nevertheless, to the extent that
stock prices have depended on cash flow rather than earnings, the new re-
strictions will act as depressants.
DEBT-FINANCED CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND RELATED PROBLEMS
The ineffectiveness of the Act's four anti-conglomerate sections lies in
their limited scope. The deductions disallowed by new Code section 279,
for example, will be only some part of the interest charges for "corporate
acquisition indebtedness." This is not all of the debt incurred in making
acquisitions -far from it. The debt involved must have these characteris-
tics:
(1) it must be issued after October 9, 1969;
(2) its purpose must be to provide consideration for the taxable
acquisition of stock in, or at least two-thirds (in value) of the operating
assets of another corporation;
(3) It must be "subordinated to the claims of trade creditors of the
issuing corporation generally," or "expressly . . . to . . . any substantial
amount of [such corporation's] unsecured indebtedness"; and
(4) it must be either convertible into stock of its issuer, or part of an
investment unit that includes an option to acquire such stock.
Moreover, debt conforming to these requirements can become "corporate
acquisition indebtedness" only if at the end of any year while it is out-
standing its issuer either has a debt-equity ratio (as defined) in excess of 2:1,
or "projected earnings" no greater than three times its annual interest re-
quirement. 29 And once corporate acquisition indebtedness has been iden-
24 H.R. 13270, at § 221. On the Treasury's recommendation, the Senate Finance Com-
mittee proposed the elimination of this provision of the House Bill "pending further
study." S. REP. 552, at 305-06. The Conference Committee restored it in somewhat mod-
ified form, effective beginning in 1972. H.R. REP. 782, at 299-300. For years prior to 1972,
the excess investment interest of non-corporate taxpayers will constitute an item of tax
preference subject to the 10 percent minimum tax. I.R.C. § 57.
25 Tax Reform Act §§ 101, 121.
261d. § 703.
27 Id. § 521. See also §§ 301, 442.
28 See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 4988 (July 14, 1969); Securities Act Release No.
4910 (June 18, 1968); AICPA, APB Op. Nos. 14, 15 (1969), 10 (1967); AICPA, COMM. ON
AUDIT PROCEDURE, STATEMENT No. 40 (1968). But see Accounting Board Approves Keeping
Interest Pooling, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 8, 1969, at 4, col. 2.
29 Tax Reform Act § 411, I.R.C. § 279(b).
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tified, deductions for the interest on it will be disallowed only to the extent
that in any year they exceed the difference between $5 million and the
interest paid by the taxpayer on debt incurred after December 31, 1967, in
making acquisitions that is not corporate acquisition indebtedness.3 0
This brief, elliptical, and probably confusing summary by no means
comprehends all of the complexities and ambiguities of the section. It does,
however, suggest why the Section of Taxation of the American Bar As-
sociation thought it likely to "contribute little toward [the] accomplishment
of its major purpose."31 A lot of debt has to accumulate in order to create
an annual interest obligation of $5 million. And, while much of the debt
issued nowadays is convertible, rather less may be sufficiently subordinated
to qualify. Even the convertible problem could in many cases be avoided
through the simple expedient of causing a subsidiary to issue debt accom-
panied by warrants to acquire stock of the parent or of some other cor-
poration.
A further softening of the impact of the interest proposal arises from
a curious diffusion of the congressional purpose. Quite gratuitously, or so
it would seem, the Ways and Means Committee's report on the provision,
in addition to its strictures on tax-induced mergers, embarked upon a dis-
cussion of the difficulties in distinguishing, for tax purposes, between debt
and equity. There followed the bland assertion that the conglomerate trend
made it
appropriate at this time to take action to resolve in a limited context
the ambiguities and uncertainties which have long existed in our tax law.
The level of merger activity and its economic implications have made this
problem of much greater significance than was previously the case.32
The resolution brought to the law's ambiguities and uncertainties by
the House Bill was not self-evident. It provided that "[n]o inference shall
be drawn from any provision in this section [279] that any instrument desig-
nated as a bond, debenture, note or certificate or other evidence of indebted-
ness by its issuer represents an obligation or indebtedness of such issuer in
applying any other provision of this title."3 3 Further, although the criteria
for corporate acquisition indebtedness resembled those applied in thin
capitalization cases, it departed significantly from the latter. Those cases had
30ld., I.R.C. § 279(a).
31Hearings on R.R. 13270 Before The Senate Comm. On Finance, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 5189 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. The provision was opposed on
similar grounds by the Committee on Taxation of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, which also thought it a possible trap in respect of all interest deductions,
too complex, and "essentially a regulatory and not a revenue raising provision." Id. at
1616-17. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants argued that "any re-
strictions on the 'tide of conglomerate mergers' should be imposed outside the tax law."
Id. at 4776.
32 H.R. REP. 413, pt. 1, at 104.
33 House Version § 411(a), I.R.C. § 279(1).
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determined debt-equity ratios on the basis of going concern value;34 the
Bill made this determination by reference to the tax basis of the issuer's
assets.3 5 Assuming, however, that the disallowance of some interest resolved
a major part of the problem, still other parts of importance were not even
touched: if no deduction were allowed for interest, did this make it a div-
idend? What would happen if the debt involved were retired or became
worthless? Could such debt, with or without some kind of voting right, qual-
ify for tax-free use in a reorganization or section 1036 exchange? Would it
constitute a second class of stock so as to make a Subchapter S election un-
available? The intrusion of these extraneous issues could not fail to weaken
the anti-conglomerate thrust; it may have been in recognition of this fact
that the Finance Committee appended the provision, hereinafter discussed,
for new regulations on the subject of debt versus equity.
The Senate accepted the House approach to the deductibility of in-
terest on acquisition debt. Its changes in the provision, most of which were
enacted, were not great, but their general tenor was lenitive. For example,
the House Bill had allowed no more than a very narrow escape from the
characterization of debt as corporate acquisition indebtedness.3 6 The Fi-
nance Committee substantially widened this: the disallowance of interest
deductions will be discontinued whenever an issuing corporation has run
for three successive years with both debt-equity and income-interest ratios
within the limits required in the first instance (as alternatives) to avoid
corporate acquisition indebtedness status.3 7
The changes in the installment reporting rules may be more far-reach-
ing. It is probably true, as the Ways and Means Committee found, that
when an acquisition is made
by exchanging debentures of the acquiring corporation for . . . stock
[of the acquiree] .... [m]uch the same tax-free effect [as arises upon a
reorganization exchange of stock for such stock] . . . is achieved by the
former shareholder if he elects to report the gain on the installment
method. Moreover, if the debentures are not redeemable for a long period
of time . . . , no gain with respect to the debentures needs to be reported
until the end of that period, that is, his tax is deferred until that time
if he holds the debentures to maturity.38
34 E.g., Miller's Estate v. Comm'r, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'g 24 T.C. 923
(1955).
35 House Version § 411(a), I.R.C. § 279(c)(2).
36d. § 411(a), I.R.C. § 279(d)(3). Under the House Version, once the taint of cor-
porate acquisition indebtedness had attached to an obligation, such obligation would have
remained tainted forever unless at a subsequent date the issuer were to have acquired
control, or substantially all the properties, of another corporation, and the combined
accounts of the issuer and acquiree at the end of the year of acquisition then satisfied
either the debt-equity ratio or the interest coverage test. H.R. REP. 413, pt. 1, at 196. The
Act in its final form retains this exception. I.R.C. § 279(d)(3). But see H.R. REP. 413, pt. 2,
at 80, stating that only subsequent ability to meet the interest coverage test can cleanse
the obligation.
37 Senate Version § 411(a), I.R.C. § 279(d)(4).
38 H.R. RrP. 413, pt. 1, at 107.
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It is also likely that the possibility of using the installment method has been
one of the inducements offered to shareholders in some of the conglomerate
acquisitions.39 That the method may in fact not be available where only
one deferred payment is contemplated" or where the debentures happen
to be convertible (as is often the case), 41 and that the tax consequences of
installment reporting may not be as simple as the Committee suggested,42
are doubtless, in this context, irrelevant. If people believe they can have
their cake and eat it too, the falsity of the proposition does not stop them.
It is the belief that informs their actions and, in this instance, gives impetus
to the merger movement.
The House response was double-barreled. In its original form, the Bill
would, first, have permitted the installment election only for those sales
of realty and casual sales of personality "in which the payments of principal
or principal and interest are required to be paid periodically and in such
amounts over the installment period as prescribed under regulations." 48 To
satisfy the "amounts" requirement, the Bill declared that it would be suf-
ficient if:
(A) such payments are required to be made at least once every two
years in relatively even or declining amounts over the installment period;
or
(B) at least 5 percent of the principal is required to have been paid
by the end of the first quarter of the installment period, at least 15
percent of the principal is required to have been paid by the end of the
second quarter of the installment period, and at least 40 percent of the
principal is required to have been paid by the end of the third quarter
of the installment period.44
The second proposal was a new rule for determining whether a sale of
realty or casual sale of personalty could qualify as an installment sale. Code
section 453(b)(2)(A) had provided that such qualification could occur only
if, in the taxable year of the transaction, there were no payments at all,
or if the payments that were made ("exclusive of evidences of indebtedness
of the purchaser") did not come to more than 30 percent of the selling price.
The House change would exclude from the term "evidences of indebtedness
of the purchaser"
a bond or other evidence of indebtedness issued by a corporation or a
government or political subdivision thereof with interest coupons attached,
in registered form, or in any other form designed to render such bond
89 Appert, Installment Reporting as a Substitute for a Tax-Free Reorganization, 22
TAX LAw. 137 (1968). See also Jewell & Turley, Techniques to Minimize the Cost of A
Taxable Stock Acquisition, 32 J. TAXATION 12 (1970).
40 Appert, supra note 39, at 139-46.
41 ld. at 147.
42 Id. at 150-60.
48 House Version § 412, I.R.C. § 453(b).
44 Id. § 412(b) proposing addition of new paragraph (3) to I.R.C. § 453(b).
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or other evidence of indebtedness readily tradable on an established
securities market.45
This latter provision represented acceptance in substance of one of the
Nixon Administration's tax reform proposals of April 22nd.4" The Senate
Finance Committee also accepted it, adding a proviso that registered bonds
would not be deemed readily tradable if the taxpayer could establish that
they were not.4 7 A Treasury recommendation with respect to the Bill that
notes payable on demand should not constitute purchasers' indebtedness
was likewise adopted.48
On the other hand, the Treasury had recommended, and the Senate
Finance Committee agreed, that the periodic payment provision should be
deleted. The ground for the Treasury view was that this proposal was
a significant departure from existing law and could disrupt the pattern
of legitimate commercial transactions where payment is deferred because of
lack of ability to make immediate payment. This is precisely the situation
that the installment sales provisions were designed to ameliorate.4 9
Perhaps it was easier for the Treasury to take this position because the one-
payment installment sale question had finally been resolved - at the ad-
ministrative level. In Revenue Ruling 69-462,5o the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) held that the installment method is not available for reporting
a gain on a sale of real property where no payment is received in the year
of sale and the entire purchase price falls due 10 years later. Moreover,
the ruling assumed that the same result had always obtained with respect to
casual sales of personalty by reason of a regulations' requirement that in
terms is confined in its application to dealers.5'
No less than the acquisition indebtedness solution, the installment sales
provision seems only part of an assault-by-nibbling. To the extent that con-
glomeration has depended on the issuance of debt securities with some form
of tax shelter for the recipients of those securities, the amendments to Code
section 453 will make the exercise more difficult. They will not make it im-
possible. The particular drafting technique adopted with respect to readily
tradable debt, for example, simply invites avoidance: the Act does not make
the delivery of such debt a "payment" thus taxing the gain attributable
to it at the time of delivery; rather the debt is treated as if it were a pay-
ment only for the purpose of satisfying the 30 percent rule. It may be that
just delaying delivery of the evidences of indebtedness until the year fol-
lowing the year of sale would save installment treatment of the transaction.
45 Id., I.R.C. § 453(b)(4).
46 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF TREASURY TAX REFORM PROPOSALS
VI-1 (1969).
47 Senate Version § 412(a), I.R.C. § 453(b)(3).
48 Id.
49 Senate Hearings 843.
50 1969 INT. REV. BULL. No. 35, at 14.
51 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(b) (1958).
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The amendments also pave the way to controversy -who knows what is
meant by "readily tradable on an established securities market"?
The FTC Staff Report On Mergers, submitted on November 4, 1969, en-
dorsed the Tax Reform Bill proposals with respect to deductions for interest
on acquisition debt and the use of the installment method for reporting
gain when marketable securities are received. 52 The Report observed, how-
ever, "that only about 15 percent of recent large mergers would classify as
purchase transactions subject to legislative modifications now under re-
view." 53 The Report notes as well the Bill's failure to deal with the special
way in which present law may foster acquisitions by companies dealing in
consumer credit. 54 The ability of Montgomery Ward to defer large amounts
of tax on its receivables until they were collected has been cited as the key
to the otherwise unlikely transaction that made Container Corporation a
Ward (renamed "Marcor") subsidiary in November, 1968. According to
officials of the new organization, Ward's
earnings were not sufficient to utilize our full tax deferral. With this
combination, we'll be in a position to bring the Container earnings under
this tax-deferred umbrella ...
[T]he basic advantage to Container Corp., from the stockholders' stand-
point, is that it enables us to extend our activity. There was some question
in our mind ... as to whether we would be able to finance our expansion
just to keep our market position, not necessarily to expand it.65
The magazine that carried this story was altogether justified in heading
it, "The marriage ... wasn't made in heaven, or even in Chicago, but in
Washington."'56 Washington's matchmaking consisted of the long-standing
rule that a dealer in personal property may report its income from sales on
the installment plan when the installment payments are received. One may
question, nevertheless, whether the FTC staff was quite as justified in im-
plying that Marcor was only one of many assemblies spawned by this par-
ticular tax accounting method, which was first officially allowed by reg-
ulation in 1919,57 though not supported by statute until 1926. 58 If tax de-
ferral had been productive of large numbers of mergers, it is difficult to
believe the staff would have failed to mention them in its report.
Under the Act, the recovery of original issue discount on corporate debt
remains ordinary income. In the case, however, of all obligations issued
after May 27, 1969, the holders will be required to include in gross income
52 FTC REPORT 25.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 156.
55 The Tax Laws, Bless 'Em, FoRBEs, Dec. 1, 1968, at 27.
56 Id.
57 Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 42 (1919).
58 Revenue Act of 1926 Ch. 27, § 212(d), 44 Stat. 23 (1926). The codification was said
to be necessary because three cases had held the regulations invalid. S. REP. No. 52, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), 1939-1 CuM. BULL. pt. 2, at 346-47.
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for each year throughout the life of the bonds that year's ratable portion of
the discount rather than wait until the bonds are called for redemption or
sold.59 Moreover, such inclusion will be necessary both for those who first
acquire the bonds and for persons who purchase them at later dates, pro-
vided that the purchases are not made at premiums.6 0 In this respect,
Congress appears to have agreed that market discount represents a mere
adjustment of interest rate that should be taxed as such. 61 To support en-
forcement of this new rule, corporations issuing their bonds or debentures
in registered form will be required to file information returns in respect of
the amounts of original issue discount accrued to bondholders in each
year. 62
The Act also added five sentences to the existing definition of "issue
price" in Code section 1232(b)(2). These establish statutory rules to cover
bonds included in investment units with options, and those issued in ex-
change for property. In the latter case, if the new bonds are traded on an
established securities market or are issued in exchange for stock or secur-
ities so traded, issue price will be determined by reference to the fair market
value of the property. But if this trading test is not met, issue price will
be deemed to be the stated redemption price at maturity.63 This provision
was designed "to clarify the situations in which original issue discount
might arise." 64 The authorities had been in conflict on whether this could
occur in the case of debt issued for property, and at least one writer had
argued most persuasively that the enactment of Code section 483 in 1964
had effectively foreclosed the possibility.65
That tax jockeying was possible under the old issue discount rules can-
59 Tax Reform Act § 413(a), I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3).
6Old. § 413, I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3)(D).
61 See de Kosmian, Original Issue Discount, 22 TAx LAw. 339 (1969). The AICPA,
through its Tax Division, opposed § 413 of the House Bill, arguing that to require the
accrual of original issue discount would "violate the well-established rules of the cash
method of accounting and . . . add to complexity and information reporting difficulties
far out of proportion to the problem." Senate Hearings 4777. As an alternative solution,
the Institute suggested the exclusion from the definition of capital assets in I.R.C. § 1221
of all nonconvertible corporate debt, thus making all gains and losses on the disposition
of such debt ordinary income or deductions. Such debt, it was argued, "is acquired . .. for
the principal purpose of realizing a yield . . . . It appears that the market value . . .
fluctuates in large measure with reference to prevailing interest yields. Accordingly, it
seems reasonable to tax as ordinary income or allow as ordinary deductions gains or losses
on disposition of obligations which are primarily mere adjustments of yields." Id. It is
believed that the Tax Division of the Department of Justice has, in settlement negotia-
tions, occasionally taken the position that a gain on the sale or redemption of noncon-
vertible bonds constituted ordinary income unless the taxpayer could demonstrate that
such gain derived from a change in the credit rating of the issuer.
62 Tax Reform Act § 413, I.R.C. § 6049(a)(1). Neither of the tax committees seems to
have been disturbed by the fact that, once the obligation has passed from its original
holder to a purchaser, the amount reported will seldom equal the amount includible in
the holder's income. Cf. Senate Hearings 5193.
63 I.R.C. § 1232(b)(2), as amended, Tax Reform Act § 413(b).
64 H.R. REP. 413, pt. I, at 110.
65 de Kosmian, supra note 61, at 549-55. But cf. Rev. Rul. 332, 1967-2 Cum. BuLL, 291.
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not be denied. And it had been regrettable that the tax law, while allowing
deductions to issuers for the discount on their bonds, was not requiring con-
current income recognition by the holders of those securities. Such incon-
sistencies of treatment inevitably give rise to avoidance transactions. But
one may be permitted to doubt whether this was a significant incentive to
the merger movement, or whether correcting it will to any degree reduce
the number of conglomerate acquisitions. The connection between this tax
incident and the process of corporate growth has simply not been proven.
The final expressly anti-conglomerate provision of the new Act is one
requiring the issuer of a convertible bond (or any corporation in control of
the issuer) who (after April 22, 1969) repurchases the bond at a premium
to reduce its deduction on account of such premium to the portion thereof
representing "a normal call premium on bonds or other evidences of in-
debtedness which are not convertible." 66 A purported exception makes the
rule inapplicable "to the extent that the corporation can demonstrate to
the satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate that such excess is attribut-
able to the cost of borrowing and is not attributable to the conversion fea-
ture." 67 This means, of course, that, pro tanto, there is no excess, the amount
in question having, under the circumstances, been absorbed into the normal
call premium.
The Ways and Means Committee offered the provision as a clarifying
amendment. 68 For the future, it resolves a litigated issue in favor of the
Service. The Service's view has been that when convertible securities were
repurchased, the part of the price paid for them attributable to the con-
version feature is analogous to a stock purchase for which, of course, no
deduction is allowed. Seeing the Government argument as, essentially, that
the result of the transaction should be determined as if the conversion had
occurred and the stock itself had been purchased, the Seventh Circuit in
Roberts & Porter, Inc. v. Commissioner rejected it:69
These notes were not, in fact, converted into stock and the stock then
sold. There is no provision in the Code or the Regulations which requires
allocation of a part of the total purchase price to the value of the con-
version privilege .... If this situation represents a breach in our revenue
wall, its repair must be effected by legislative action rather than by
judicial interpretation. 70
The invitation so extended has now been accepted -and "no inference
shall be drawn from the fact that [the new Code] section 249 .. .does not
apply" to repurchases made before the effective date. 71
66 Tax Reform Act § 414(a), I.R.C. § 249(a).
67 Id.
68 H.R. REP. 413, pt. 1, at 111.
69 307 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1962), rev'g 37 T.C. 23 (1961).
70 307 F.2d at 747-48; accord, Southwest Grease & Oil Co. v. United States, CCH
1969 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAs. (69-2 at 85,895) 9688 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 1969);
cf. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Glenn, 394 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1968).
71 Tax Reform Act § 414(c). See H.R. REP. 413, pt. I, at Ill. The Treasury, in recom-
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If the previous tax rule (or uncertainty) had a nexus to the merger af-
fliction, it was not an obvious one. To be sure, all conglomerates sooner
or later seem to produce convertible issues, what is issued may in due course
be repurchased, and it may, when this happens, fetch a premium. But is this
the kind of thing that makes Jimmy (Ling, that is) run? The ability at some
future date to deduct more than the Service regards as proper on account of
debt repurchases seems hardly to be of great utility to anybody.
THE STOCK DIVIDEND PROVISIONS
At the outset, it was suggested that some parts of the Act not expressly
aimed at conglomerates might, in the long run, prove more damaging to
the movement than those bearing the anti-conglomerate label. There is
some evidence that the conglomerateurs share this conviction. Among the
angry multitude appearing before the Finance Committee, there was only
one witness representing a well-known conglomerate whose testimony
achieved wide publicity. This was Glenn McDaniel, Chairman of the Exec-
utive Committee of Litton Industries. He appeared on September 17th, and
attacked, not the sections discussed above, but rather section 421, entitled
"Stock dividends," which makes a rather sweeping change in Code section
305.72
As Code sections go, 305 was - in the good old days before December
30, 1969 -rather simple. It said that all distributions (with two minor
exceptions) to the shareholders of a corporation in stock, or rights to ac-
quire the stock, of such corporation were not includible in those share-
holders' incomes. The only distributions of this type that did constitute
income were (a) those made to pay preference dividends for the corpora-
tion's current or immediately preceding taxable year, and (b) those in lieu
of which the shareholder had an election to take property.
To change anything of such purity is inevitably to make it complex,
and probably obscure. What Congress has done seems to have both of these
results.
The Reform Act does not alter the pattern of section 305. It retains
a general rule subject to specific exceptions. Unless "otherwise provided,"
dividends taking the form of stock of the paying corporation, or rights to
acquire such stock, continue to be excluded from gross income. But now
much more will be otherwise provided. In its new form, section 305 declares
that its general rule will not apply, and the rules of section 301 will apply,
to any distribution by a corporation of its own stock which
(1) at the election of any of the shareholders, is payable either in such
stock or in property;
(2) "has the result of" the receipt of property by some shareholders,
and an increase in the proportionate interests of others;
mending the provision, had taken the position that, since it would be merely declaratory
of existing law, it should apply retroactively. U.S. TREAS. DEP'T., supra note 46, at VI-7.
72 Tax Reform Act § 421, I.R.C. § 305.
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(3) "has the result of" a receipt of preferred stock by some common
shareholders, and of common stock by other common shareholders;
(4) is made with respect to preferred stock and does not have as its
sole purpose preventing a dilution of conversion rights of such stock by
reason of a stock dividend or stock split with respect to the stock into
which the preferred is convertible; or
(5) consists of convertible preferred unless the Secretary is satisfied
that it will not have the same effect as the second of the above cases.73
In addition, the section now requires the issuance of regulations
under which a change in conversion ratio, a change in redemption price,
a difference between redemption price and issue price, a redemption
which is treated as a distribution to which section 301 applies, or any
transaction (including a recapitalization) having a similar effect on the
interest of any shareholder shall be treated as a distribution with respect
to any shareholder whose proportionate interest in the earnings and
profits or assets of the corporation is increased by such change, difference,
redemption, or similar transaction.74
And, finally, as used in all of the foregoing, the term "shareholder" is
deemed to include "a holder of rights or of convertible securities." 75 In
other words, for example, changes in the rights of the holders of convertible
debentures may now result in the realization either by such holders, or by
other investors, of dividend income.
In recommending legislation along these lines, the Treasury argued
that, since 1954, "some corporations have used various devices which achieve
substantially the same results as obtained by the granting of a choice to
shareholders" to take their dividends either in stock or in property. Pre-
sumably these "devices" gave rise to no income, whereas, by express stat-
utory provision, the choice to which they were equated would. In any event,
the availability of such alternatives was said to have "led to a potential
substantial revenue loss and to inequities among the recipients of corporate
dividend distributions." 76
It is not at all clear why the Treasury wanted this change in the law.
The amended version of Regulations section 1.305-2 (first proposed in 1956,
but promulgated only early in 1969)77 seemed elaborate enough to reach al-
most any abuse. Consider, for example, this sweeping view of the 1954
statute:
Section 305(b)(2) refers to every election, whether express or implied,
regardless of how or when exercised or exercisable. An election is a choice
to receive payment in one medium or another. The point in time at which
such choice is made, whether before or after the declaration, is immaterial
7I1d., I.R.C. § 305(b).
741d., I.R.C. § 305(c).
75 Id., I.R.C. § 305(d)(2).
76 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, supra note 46, at X-2.
77 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2, 21 Fed. Reg. 5104 (1956), continued, 25 Fed. Reg.
6183 (1960), withdrawn and new proposal substituted, 33 Fed. Reg. 12,744 (1968), final
Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2, TD. 6990, 1969 INT. REV. BULL. No. 8, at 12, as amended, T.D.
7004, 1969 Irr. REy. BULL. No. 11, at 11.
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as long as at some point in time any shareholder, either by action or in-
action, has made a choice which permitted the corporation to distribute
stock or stock rights with respect to some shares and money or other
property with respect to other shares. . . . [I]f some shareholders agree,
expressly or impliedly, to accept distributions in stock or stock rights
with respect to their common stock notwithstanding the distribution of
money or other property with respect to other common stock, any distribu-
tions of stock or stock rights with respect to some but not all of the
corporation's common stock would be outside the provisions of section
305(a). . . . Where a corporation having two types of common stock
outstanding, with respect to which dividends may be paid in stock on one
type and in money . . . on the other type, makes a distribution . . . in
money ... as to one type and in stock ... as to the other, the distribution
of the stock is not under section 305(a) since, in substance, there is a choice
as to the medium of payment of any distribution by virtue of the existence
of the two types of common stock, shares of either of which may be
exchanged for shares of the other under section 1036 without recognition
of gain or loss. 7 8
One almost wonders if wanting more was not evidence of doubt that the
regulation really did state the law.
The new section 305 does go well beyond the regulations. In adopting
it, Congress accepted the Ways and Means Committee rationale that, how-
ever much naughtiness might have been foreclosed administratively, the
1954 liberalization in the stock dividend rules had encouraged other hanky-
panky that must also be stopped.79
The McDaniel testimony disputed this premise. Evidence was adduced
tending to show that, since 1954, there had been no general turn by cor-
porations to devices of the type condemned, nor any real increase in either
the value of stock dividends or their use as a substitute for cash. It was noted
that high-bracket taxpayers, whatever the fate of the proposed amendment,
would still be able to concentrate their investments in low or zero yield
growth shares - even within a corporation which had other shareholders
receiving generous cash payouts. And the point was made that, conceding
the need for disallowing such an option, the proposals restored the fearsome
complexity of the pre-1954 proportionate interest test, interfered with per-
fectly legitimate capital arrangements, discriminated against common stock-
holders, and raised serious constitutional questions. All in all, Mr. McDaniel
saw the proposal as a needless and costly addition to the law.8 0
Anyone aware of the history of Litton Industries will understand Mr.
McDaniel's concern. Since 1959, the corporation has paid no cash dividends
to its common stockholders. The only thing these people have received has
78 Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2(b)(1) (1969).
79 H.R. REP. 413, pt. 1, at 112.
80 Senate Hearings 2277 passim. Mr. McDaniel seemed also to be hinting at a
conspiracy: his prepared statement contained a reproachful reference to the recommenda-
tions for revision of § 305 made by the great "subchapter C Advisory Group." Id. at 2282.
See SUBCHAPTER C ADvISORY GRoup, House COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REVISED REPORT
ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS 14-16 (Comm. Print 1958).
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been more stock. At the same time, an aggressive acquisition program has
been going on. Both convertible debentures and convertible preferred stock
have been issued in this connection. In negotiating the terms of such issues,
a prime objective . . .is to minimize the dilution of the interests of its
comon shareholders should conversion occur . . . when possible, by
trying to obtain the right to pay annual stock dividends to the common
stockholders without having to adjust the rate of conversion in the con-
vertible stock or security or by periodically increasing the conversion
price.8S
Litton's "Series B" convertible preferred was created in just such a
negotiation. Used as consideration in several mergers, it is designed to ac-
commodate, on the one hand, the desires of stockholders of the acquired
corporations for cash dividends and for a chance to participate in Litton's
growth; and, on the other, Litton's insistence that these shareholders not
have the benefit of both cash dividends and (through a conversion right) the
stock dividends Litton's common stockholders are getting. The preferred
provides, therefore,
that its conversion rate will be increased only if and to the extent that
the value of stock dividends distributed on the common in any year
exceeds the cash per share payable on the preferred; and that its conver-
sion rate will decrease if in any year the value of the stock dividends on
the common is less per share than the cash dividend rate for the pre-
ferred.8 2
Since this highly sophisticated issue first appeared, market fluctuations
in the value of Litton's common stock have several times changed the pre-
ferred's conversion ratio. It has gone up, and it has gone down. Had the
Reform Act then been the law, each decline in the ratio would have re-
sulted in a realization of income by the holders of the common stock-
even though, as Mr. McDaniel stressed, no conversion might ever occur and
though conversion, if effected, might well be at the original rate. Moreover,
while imputing income when a conversion rate goes down, the provision
would impute no loss when the rate goes up. All of this Mr. McDaniel
thought "bizarre. '8 3
Litton's tender concern for its stockholders may be unusual. The re-
sults that flow from it in the form of changes in conversion ratio are not.
The stockholders of other corporations will also have problems under the
new version of section 305, some of which will be rather odd.
In a recent private placement, the institutional investor bought a pack-
age consisting of common stock and warrants, exercisable for at least seven
years, to buy still more common. The warrants stated an "initial purchase
price" for the additional stock, but then provided:
81 Senate Hearings 2286.
82 Id. at 2286-87.
s3 id. at 2287.
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If, however, the "earnings per share" ("EPS") of the Company . . . for
1969 . .. is less than [the amount specified for that year] the Initial
Purchase Price shall be reduced by $10, . . . [and by lesser amounts for
EPS shortfalls in later years].
If the EPS for any year.. . is less than the [specified amount] ...then
for each 1¢ of EPS below . . . . [the warrant-holder], at its option, shall
receive warrants to purchase an additional 445 shares of the Company's
Common Stock at the Purchase Price then in effect, and such Warrants
shall be entitled to the same rights and benefits as provided herein.
From the outset the warrants were freely transferable and independent of
the stock with which they had been purchased. However, the special rights
to reductions in the warrant price or to receive additional warrants
shall not inure to or be enforceable by any holder of a Warrant other than
[the original purchaser] or any transferee of [the original purchaser's]
entire interest in the warrants.
It would be downright fascinating to watch the Secretary - or his del-
egate - wrestling with this problem as he composes the regulations that the
Act contemplates. If the original purchaser were to dispose of all its war-
rants, and if earnings per share did fall short, should anybody be charged
with income as the warrant price went down and the number of warrants
increased? Or is this a case that can be tackled only with further legislation?
Of even more pressing concern, however, is what the forthcoming reg-
ulations will say about the less ingenious transactions that are part of the
daily grind. Suppose a corporation has outstanding a conventional issue of
cumulative preferred stock entitled to a liquidating preference (or a call
price) of "par plus accrued dividends." If one of the preferred dividends is
passed, will this result in such a "change in redemption price" as to consti-
tute a constructive dividend to the preferred shareholders? And if the cor-
poration later makes up the arrearage, will the payment (a "distribution to
which section 301 applies") so increase the common stockholders' propor-
tionate interests as to put them in receipt of dividends then?
The Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association excepted to
Bill section 421 on broader grounds than those offered by Mr. McDaniel,
but with equal vehemence.
Many problems ... are dealt with only by creating a broad authority
to tax and leaving it to the Secretary or his delegate to develop specific
rules. This method ... will likely leave the law in an unfortunate state
of uncertainty for years to come. Moreover, the bill would aggrayate the
present lack of coordination and integration of the treatment of stock
dividends with other areas of subchapter C, such as the rules concerning
redemptions, liquidation, recapitalizations and section 306 stock. Any
regulations issued under proposed section 305 and revised regulations
under section 306 are certain to be even more complex than the statute....
It is recommended that modification of section 305 be deferred and be
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made a part of and integrated with a more comprehensive technical
revision of subchapter C of the Code.8 4
A somewhat more restrained, but equally definite, criticism was offered
by the Committee on Taxation of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York. 5 On the other hand, the new rules were endorsed by the Com-
merce and Industry Association of New York,8 6 and the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants.87 The last approval was particularly sur-
prising in view of the Institute's earlier opposition to the section 305 reg-
ulations.88
All the spirited protest proved unavailing. The new rules will apply
to distributions with respect to, or increases in the conversion ratio of, all
stock issued on or after January 10, 1969, or, in those cases where amended
section 305 regulations (promulgated on that date) do not apply, on or after
April 22, 1969. But the holders of shares issued prior to one or the other
of those dates will not begin to feel any effect until January 1, 1991.89
The Treasury's hopes for a radical revision of section 305 seem to have
been well-founded. Exciting forms of capitalization developed since 1954,
or more prevalent than they had been, will hereafter, at the very least, be
open to question. The change in this aspect of the law will not bring the
conglomerate bandwagon to a screeching halt, but it may markedly trans-
form particular incidents of the operation. Not all of these have been tax-
motivated.
WHAT ELSE COULD CONGRESS HAVE DONE?
Rehearsal of the Litton arguments against the section 305 amendments
illustrates the problems created for the conglomerates, perhaps without
conscious design, by the Tax Reform Act, but does not exhaust them. The
Tax Reform Act went further to stem the merger tide than the reports of
either of the tax-writing committees admitted. The stock dividend provision
is only one of the ways in which it did so.
But this is not to say that either that provision, or anything else in
the Act, would absolutely bar future acquisitions. Even in this narrow and
highly technical area, tax reform is less than total. And if the aim was truly
to eliminate all of "the features of the tax laws which ... provide a special
and unwarranted inducement to mergers," 90 much, much more could have
been done.
84 Id. at 5193.
851d. at 1624.
86 Id. at 4742.
87 Id. at 4801.
88AICPA (TAx. Div.), COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION 305 OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (1968).
89 Tax Reform Act § 421(b).
90 H.R. REp. 413, pt. 1, at 101.
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Perhaps the starting point for any effort along these lines should be to
eliminate some discrimination. The argument has been made, not alto-
gether in jest, that the tax law promotes economic concentration through
detriments rather than benefits. "[T]he Government," in Gustave Simons'
opinion, "is doing its best to compel corporations to merge." 91 He supports
this charge by citing the following pressures upon small businesses and their
owners:
(1) heavy estate taxes, made heavier through inflated valuations of stock
not publicly traded, and impossible to provide for because of the section
264 limitations on deductions for interest incurred to purchase life in-
surance;
(2) the minute scrutiny of small corporation entertainment expenses, a
trial to which big companies are seldom subjected;
(3) the tax on unreasonable accumulations which, it is alleged, has
never been invoked against a major publicly-held corporation; and
(4) the severe application, in the case of small companies, of the
reasonableness test for salaries.
But these are only part of the story. Mr. Simons says, "[t]here are in-
numerable other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and administra-
tive practices of the Internal Revenue Service which are prejudicial to small
corporations." 92 His message is loud and clear: if you don't stop pushing
the little guys around, they'll all let themselves be gobbled up by the giants.
There is something, but not very much, to be said for this view. None-
theless, it may have been in deference to it that the Senate Finance Com-
mittee made one of its numerous additions to the Reform Bill. Endorsed
by the Conference and enacted, this amended Code section 537 (defining the
business needs for which accumulations are deemed reasonable) to permit
the retention, in the year of a stockholder's death and thereafter, of the
amount necessary to effect a section 303 redemption of his holdings.98 Only
a fantastic imagination will perceive a causal connection between this pro-
vision and the anti-merger syndrome.
Turning to the benefits that induce mergers, the obvious point of attack
is the nonrecognition of gain in reorganization exchanges. As already noted,
the most frequently used method of acquisition is a trade of stock of the
acquiring corporation for the stock or assets of the acquiree. Such a trans-
action can, without too much distortion, be tax-free and it usually is. The
question is whether it always should be. The staff of the FTC does not
think so.
The special treatment of gain realized through acquisition is some-
thing of an anomaly in our tax laws. Congress has generally been loath
to grant exemptions from the general principle that gains arising out of an
91 Letter to the Financial Editor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1969, § 5, at 17, col. 2.
92 Id.
93 Tax Reform Act § 906, I.R.C. § 537(a) (amend.) applicable to the Section 551 tax
with respect to years ending after May 26, 1969.
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exchange transaction are taxable at the time of the exchange. In an
economy where decentralized decision-making is prized and competition
is the prime regulator, it is unfortunate that the most sweeping provisions
in our tax code involving tax exemption in exchange transactions relate
to mergers and acquisitions. Many business transactions and substantial
amounts of otherwise taxable gains and losses are involved. 94
For this reason, the staff insists that whenever the consideration given in an
acquisition takes the form of marketable securities, the gain realized by the
recipients of such securities should be recognized and subjected to tax.
This, by and large, was the position taken as early as 1957 by Jerome
Hellerstein. In his view, "[t]he reorganization provisions entered the
income-tax law ... to effectuate the innocent purpose of dealing with mere
'changes in form and not in substance.'-"5 Such a purpose would not sup-
port the present grant of across-the-board nonrecognition. The receipt of
publicly-traded stock or securities is the equivalent of a receipt of cash and
this is hardly a change in form only.96
A less drastic approach might be the implementation of the rule, or a
variant thereof, long contained in the regulations, that a tax-free reorga-
nization "must be an ordinary and necessary incident of the conduct of the
enterprise and must provide for a continuation of the enterprise." 97 This
could be interpreted to require recognition whenever the reorganization
exchange involves, for either or both of the corporate parties, a change in
the type of business conducted.
At one time, the Service so construed it. Revenue Ruling 56-330 held
that there had been no reorganization when the stockholders of three cor-
porations transferred all their stock to a newly-organized entity in return
for all of the stock of the latter.98 But this view was rejected in Bentsen v.
Phinney,9 9 where the court asserted that the law required only that the sur-
viving corporation continue in some business. Consequently, Revenue Rul-
ing 56-330 was revoked in 1963 and the National Office conceded that the
"surviving corporation need not continue the activities conducted by its
predecessors."'100
In the light of such a history, legislation would clearly be required to
reinstate the principle, especially if there were any thought of extending
it as might be deemed necessary. The corner garage absorbed into General
Motors might continue to operate the same old business, but its former
owner, basking at Mallorca on his GM dividends, cannot be said to have
much of a continuing interest in the same kind of business he once had.
94 FTC REPoRT 25-26.
95 Hellerstein, Merger, Taxes and Realism, 71 HARV. L. REV. 254, 291 (1957).
901 d. at 291-92.
in Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(c) (1955).
98 Rev. Rul. 330, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 204.
s9 199 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
'fi Rev. Rul. 29, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 77.
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Here, surely, and in many other cases, the economic realities that should be
determinative of tax incidence cry aloud for change.
Hellerstein's was a seminal paper. It is impossible to examine tax policy
with respect to reorganizations without weighing his remarks. His analysis
seems deficient, however, in its failure to accord due weight to some of the
detriments of reorganizations. The rules, as Elliott Manning observed, work
both ways and
are not an unmixed blessing to taxpayers . . . . They prevent the im-
mediate recognition of losses as well as postpone the recognition of gain,
and the fact that assets transferred in a reorganization retain their old
basis in a period of rising prices may mean that the price of nonrecognition
of gain is a lower base for future depreciation deductions. In addition, the
almost automatic treatment of boot as having the effect of a dividend may
result in more tax than if the reorganization exchange had not been given
special "limited" recognition of gain.101
These considerations impel us to ask if there are not steps, short of
recognizing gain at the instant of merger, which might still prove effective.
Convertible stock or debt has become almost a talisman of the modern ac-
quisition. What would happen if conversion were made a taxable event?
Would this so disparage convertible issues as to make them no longer
useful? And in this event, would any significant number of prospective
mergers become too costly to be practicable?
The fact of the matter is that there is no statutory authority for treating
the conversion of either stock or debt as a tax-free transaction. Moreover,
the literal language of Code section 1022 would seem to require a tax. And
yet, since 1920, with respect to bonds and debentures, and 1925, in the case
of preferred stock, the Service has consistently found that no income
arises. 102 Principles so ancient can scarcely be susceptible of reversal by reg-
ulation or ruling, but there seems to be no barrier to legislative correction.
We might also ponder in this connection the capital gains treatment
described in the Canadian Government's White Paper on tax reform tabled
in Ottawa on November 9, 1969. The proposal is not merely to end the
long-standing exclusion of capital gains from the incomes of Canadian tax-
payers. This would be controversial enough. The government seeks also to
tax unrealized appreciation when property is transferred by gift, to provide
for a carry-over of basis at death and - most dramatic of all- with respect
to holdings of shares in widely-held Canadian companies:
Taxpayers other than widely-held Canadian corporations . . . would
be required to revalue these shares to market value every five years and
take one-half of the resulting gain or loss into account for tax purposes
101 Manning, "In Pursuance of the Plan of Reorganization": The Scope of the
Reorganization Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARv. L. REy. 881, 917
(1959).
102 Fleischer & Cary, The Taxation of Convertible Bonds and Stock, 74 HARV. L.
Rav. 473 (1961).
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in that year. A special rate is proposed for widely-held Canadian corpora-
tions to avoid double tax.10
It is difficult to imagine any scheme that could more effectively take the
steam out of the merger movement than this abrupt departure from historic
realization concepts.
We have come a long way from the happy day of the "vehicle," that
thoroughly unsuccessful corporation which was ever for sale at high price
to someone in need of its loss carryovers. Only if sale were too long delayed,
only if those carryovers "died on the vine," could the enterprise truly fail.
Ours is a less ingenuous age. Today the vehicle is a potential conglomerate.
The Textron, Bangor-Punta and Studebaker empires were all constructed
in the shelter afforded by past disasters. 104
If more creations of this kind represent a clear and present danger, if
Congress is genuinely alarmed over what the Penn-Central may blossom into,
the means of stunting that exotic growth lie ready at hand. A flat prohibition
on the use of carryovers in all such circumstances would doubtless be suf-
ficiently preventive to suit the most demanding. A less Draconian remedy
might be some expansion of the principle of Code section 382.105 It is rea-
sonable to ask, however, whether we should just let well enough alone.
There is already so much law on this subject, and the likelihood of a novel
approach is so slight, that almost any tinkering would be suspect.
But suppose, for good and sufficient reason, we do confine our attack
to the debt aspect of acquisitions. Is not more than the feeble effort of the
Tax Reform Act possible? Even Ways and Means knows that it is. H.R.
7489, introduced last February by Chairman Mills, would have limited
deductions for interest whenever more than 35 percent of the consideration
for an acquisition of stock consisted of debt instruments or of property at-
tributable to borrowing.10 6 As is the provision actually made law, H.R.
7489 was strangely narrow in its scope. Its terms suggested more a desire to
protect managements from hostile tender offers then a will to damp merger
fires. But this little bill would still have a greater effect on acquisitions than
new Code section 279.
WHY DOEs EVERYBODY HAVE THIS THING ABOUT DEBT?
And this leads us to the question, why do the anti-conglomerate pro-
visions of the Tax Reform Act concentrate on debt? Is there something
peculiarly evil in its use to grease the merger wheels? Or is this preoc-
103 E. BENSON, PROPOSALS FOR TAX REFoRM 40-41 (1969).
104 FTC REPORT 153 passim.
105 Compare Asimow, Detriment and Benefit of Net Operating Losses: A Unifying
Theory, 24 TAx L. REv. 1 (1968), with HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUBCHAPTER C
ADViSORY GROUP PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, As REVISED § 29 and accompanying REVISED RE-
PORT ON CORPORATE DISTRmBUTIONS AND ADjUSTMENTS 89-95 (Comm. Print 1958). See also
AICPA (TAx Div.), TESTIMONY ON TAX REFORM PROPOSALS PRESENTED TO HOUSE WAYS AND
MEANS COMMITTEE 120-24 (1969).
106 H.R. REP. No. 7489, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(a)(1 & 2) (1969).
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cupation evidence of a King Charles' Head complex, an omnipresent and,
therefore, seldom pertinent consideration?
The Ways and Means Committee's extraordinary detour into the thin
capitalization morass has already been noted. The Finance Committee
proved even more con erned. In addition to accepting the House's acquisi-
tion indebtedness provision without much change, its revision of the Bill,
followed in this respect by the conference substitute, included express
authority for regulations to determine for all purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code, "whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated ... as
stock or indebtedness." The regulations shall set forth "factors which are to
be taken into account" in the determination, and such factors may include,
inter alia:
(1) whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay on de-
mand or on a specified date a sum certain in money in return for an
adequate consideration in money or money's worth, and to pay a fixed
rate of interest,
(2) whether there is subordination to or preference over any in-
debtedness of the corporation,
(3) the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation,
(4) whether there is convertibility into the stock of the corporation,
and
(5) the relationship between holdings of stock in the corporation
and holdings of the interest in question.107
107 Tax Reform Act § 415, I.R.C. § 385 (new). "It is not intended that only these
factors be included in the guidelines or that with respect to a particular situation, any
of these factors must be included in the guidelines, or that any of the factors which are
included by statute must necessarily be given any more weight than other factors added
by regulations." S. REP. 552, at 138. The 1956-1958 Advisory Group on Subchapter C
recommended the addition to the Code of a definition of corporate indebtedness in order
to provide "greater certainty .. . as a guide ... in ordinary case." SUBCHAPTER C ADVISORY
GROUP, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REVISED REPORT ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTION
AND ADJUSTMENTS 24 (Comm. Print 1958). The definition was designed to have limited
usefulness and "intended to be without prejudice to the determination of the status of
other alleged obligations." Id. SUBCHAPTER C ADVISORY GROUP PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, As
REVISED, § 10 (Comm. Print 1958) provided:
indebtedness of a corporation shall include in all events . . . any unconditional
obligation in writing . . . to pay on demand or before a specified and not un-
reasonably distant date a sum certain in money incurred upon a distribution to
shareholders or for an adequate consideration in money or money's worth and
under circumstances which do not negate any reasonable expectation of pay-
ment if-
(1) the obligation is not by agreement subordinated to the claims of trade
creditors generally, and
(2) payment, if any, for use of the principal amount is not excessive, is not
dependent upon the earnings of the corporation, and is unconditionally
due not later than the maturity date of the principal amount, and
(3) the obligation does not entitle the obligee to vote upon the election of
directors of the corporation, and
(4) in case the obligation is initially held or guaranteed by a shareholder of
the corporation, immediately after the obligation is created the principal
amount of all obligations of the corporation held or guaranteed by its
shareholders does not exceed by more than five-to-one the fair value of
the outstanding stock of the corporation or the total of the capital and
surplus paid-in with respect thereto, whichever is greater.
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We should probably understand this grant, which can hardly transcend
the general power conferred upon the Secretary in Code section 7805, as no
more than a directive to regulate. But even this seems supererogatory. Al-
though no present regulation addresses itself exhaustively to the debt-equity
dichotomy, the matter has been treated by way of ruling. In his recent
presentation before an American Bar Association National Institute, 08
Commissioner Thrower adverted to Revenue Ruling 68-54, enumerating
criteria for debt characterization in the case of the registered subordinated
debentures issued by New York Stock Exchange member corporations. 109
These instruments are troublesome because their issuers habitually operate
on large amounts of debt and, indeed, are permitted by Exchange rules to
maintain debt-equity ratios as high as 20:1.110 Moreover, in determining
compliance with those rules, the Exchange treats these debentures as
equity."' Nevertheless, the ruling holds that for tax purposes they con-
stitute indebtedness. The attributes militating in favor of this conclusion
were the following:
(1) The debentures were payable within a reasonable period of time
and on a fixed date;
(2) Payments of principal and fixed interest were not dependent upon
earnings, and additional interest that was contingent upon earnings was
based on a fixed formula; although a default in interest payments would
not accelerate maturity, it would give rise to a cause of action for non-
payment;
(3) Although the debentures were subordinated to the claims of
creditors, they had priority over all classes of stock;
(4) The debenture holders had no vote or management powers;
(5) The debtor's capital was sufficient for normal business operations,
and its earnings history made it reasonable for a debenture holder to
expect to be paid;
(6) On the basis of all the facts and circumstances, it appeared that
the parties intended to create a debtor-creditor relationship.112
The Commissioner noted also that the persons to whom these de-
bentures were issued were "strangers with no equity in the corporation"
and that the debentures were not convertible. 113 In other words, the deben-
ture-holders were not also stockholders, and they had no expectation of
becoming stockholders at some later date.
Mr. Thrower then went on to contrast with what he called the "'safe
harbor' rule ' 11 4 of Revenue Ruling 68-54, the conditions obtaining in the
usual debt-financed acquisition:
108 DAILY REP. EXEC. J-1 (Oct. 27, 1969).
109 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 69.
110 CCH N.Y. STOCK EXcH. GUIE Rule 325(a), 2325, at 3525 (May, 1964).
1 Id. Rule 325(b)(2)(E), at 3526 & Rule 325.20, 2325.20, at 3544 (Dec. 1969).
112 Rev. Rul. 54, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 70.
113 DAMY REP. EXEC. J-2 (Oct. 27, 1969).
114 Id.
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In the usual situation the stockholders of the acquired corporation own
the entire equity of a going business having a value in excess of its book
value. . . .These equity holders are exchanging their equity for convert-
ible debentures in the acquiring corporation. The convertible debentures
may also be subordinated to various classes of other creditors. The face
amount of the convertible debentures to be issued take into account the
fair market value of the book assets as well as the other factors affecting
the earning capacity of the business, including good will.
The owner of the acquired corporation is contributing his equity to
the acquiring corporation on the basis of what he can bargain for in terms
of face value of debentures and conversion rights. It seems probable that
in today's market, the convertible debentures issued in many of the acqui-
sitions could not have been sold for cash at their face amount ....
It further appears reasonable to conjecture that the historical earnings
of the acquiring corporation, together with the acquired corporation,
may not be adequate to service the principal of the convertible deben-
tures, together with its interest obligations.
It would seem that at some point in conglomerate acquisitions the
mere size of the convertible debentures to be issued can be relatively
so large as to create a "thin" capitalization situation in the acquiring
corporation .... Where at the conclusion of the negotiations a top-heavy
debt structure results, it is difficult to see how the former owners of the
acquired corporation suddenly became prudent lenders.
It may be that an extremely profitable operation and substantial
growth of the combined business will be necessary to earn profits to meet
the debt service imposed by the convertible debentures issued in the
transaction.
Indeed, it may be that the dominant attraction of the debenture is
in the right, through conversion, to participate in future growth of the
conglomerate business. The holder may well be more interested in cash-
ing in on the stock rise than in collecting a "debt." 11
On the strength of this testimony, it is evident that the Service neither
needs authority to establish standards nor lacks ideas of what the standards
should be. The Commissioner's encomiums for Revenue Ruling 68-54 were
too pointed to be ignored.
But even if there were no administrative norms, this is hardly an
uncharted sea. Thin capitalization is, to be sure, a court-made doctrine;
as such, it partakes of the weakness of all such glosses on the law. Judges,
not conspicuous for their espousal of monolithic constructions, have made
no exception here. It is therefore impossible to draw from opinions in
hundreds of cases any synthesis that is wholly consistent. Admitting this,
however, does not imply that we cannot see when a corporation is thin, or
that we do not know what to do about it.
If there is a problem, then, it may just be one of enforcement. The
Ways and Means Committee cited Securities and Exchange Commission data
to the effect that, in recent years, the largest increase in securities registra-
tions had occurred with respect to bonds and that, toward the end of 1968,
115 Id. at J-2, J-3.
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the rate of this increase had accelerated. 16 Policing tax avoidance is always
difficult when it becomes wholesale.
Moreover, without some change in the statute or regulations, it might
prove impossible to attack thin capitalization in the conglomerate context.
Agents capable of recognizing the malady in closely-held enterprises might
not be so perceptive when auditing listed corporations with millions in
publicly-traded bonds. Unhappily too, the aspect of economic muscle in-
trudes. The popguns the Service uses with such telling effect against corner
garages are not the sort of ordinance called for when the game you stalk is
Textron or ITT.
This would not be the first time the Treasury and Service have sup-
ported the enactment of new law as a substitute for effective audits,11 and
there may be something to be said for the method. Having the rules spelled
out in the Code probably does deter a fair amount of incorrect reporting
that would otherwise have to be caught, if at all, by examining agents.
It may be, of course, that our law has not yet developed sufficiently
to support an all-out attack on the kind of corporate paper now prevalent.
The recently issued Canadian Proposals for Tax Reform would restrict
interest deductions only with respect to debt payable to shareholders and
then only when the ratio of such debt to equity exceeds 3:1.118 Our own thin
capitalization doctrine is hardly more advanced. In our cases, although
debt-equity ratios have been determined by reference to total debt, or to
longstanding exclusion of capital gains from the incomes of Canadian tax-
total funded debt, the interest deductions (or other debt incidents) disal-
lowed have been none except those related to debt owed to shareholders.
So confined, the present rules would not apply to much of today's out-
standing acquisition indebtedness. The people who hold it may once have
been shareholders (of the acquired corporation), but their position vis-A-
vis the present issuer is that of creditors. Perhaps, catching them in the thin
incorporation net will require a little more weaving than we now have.
In the circumstances of many of the conglomerates, it may be, in Com-
missioner Thrower's words, "difficult to see how the former owners of the
acquired enterprise suddenly became prudent lenders."'119 Indeed, they
themselves, in this apocalyptic year, have learned that the market price of
116 H.R. REP. 413, pt. 1, at 102.
117 E.g., REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROB-
LEMS UNDER PRESENT LAW RELATING TO DEDUCTION OF TRAVEL AND ENTERTAINMENT EX-
PENSE, in Hearings on the Tax Recommendation of the President Before the House Comm.
on Ways & Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 154, 163 (1961); id. at 166 (analysis of some court
decisions and administrative cases). Cf. id. at 1635 (statement of Frank V. Olds, Con-
trollers Inst. of America Comm. on Fed. Tax). But see Smith, General Business Expense
With Particular Reference to Entertainment, Gift and Travel Expenses, in TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM 1085-86 (Comm. Print 1959). As to the tax lawyer's function in such cir-
cumstances, see Knickerbocker, Entertainment and Related Deductions Under the Revenue
Act of 1962, 31 FORDHAM L. REv. 639, 659 (1963).
118 E. BENSON, supra note 103, at 78.
119 DAILY REP. EXEC. J-3 (Oct. 27, 1969).
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equity disguised as debt has precious little debt-like stability. 120 But waiting
for the courts to encounter this difficulty and react appropriately may prove
less than rewarding. A legislative solution is quicker and more certain -
even if it does multiply our controversies.
CONCLUSION
To the extent that the congressional tax reformers have chosen to
attack the merger movement, they have moved cautiously and with limited
objectives- so limited, indeed, that few taxpayers will be seriously affected.
They have not attempted to rid the tax law of the provisions tending most
to encourage business consolidations, or even to limit the applicability of
such provisions.
In a number of instances the new Act does seem, as if by accident, to
inhibit conglomerate activity. Such fortuitous effects could, in the long run,
prove more important than the four sections specifically labelled as merger
deterrents.
The intrusion into the congressional deliberations of the thin capital-
ization issue seems unfortunate. It diverts attention from major questions
of tax policy and has no legitimate place in the statute. One can justify its
presence only on somewhat meager enforcement grounds.
As a whole, the Tax Reform Act may move us a few faltering steps
closer to tax equity. But it does nothing at all to simplify the law. Perhaps
simplicity is a chimera. On the other hand, must all revisions in the Internal
Revenue Code be conceived as relief acts for lawyers and accountants? It
is hard to believe that our monster tax law will not some day collapse
under its own inert mass.
120 See Convertible Bonds: The Parachute That Failed to Open, Foaaas, Sept. 15,
1969, at 30; Comic Conglomerates, FoaRBs, Nov. 1, 1969, at 50.
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